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1 Introduction
This note deals with the existence of steady-state equilibria in OLG economies. In this
profuse literature the most celebrated result is due to Muller and Woodford (1988):
in contrast with to economies constituted exclusively of life-cyclers (Diamond (1965)’s
models),1 economies with at least one infinitely lived agent experience at least one
non-trivial steady-state2 equilibrium.
Since the seminal paper of Barro (1974), infinitely lived agents are often reinter-
preted as dynasties of altruists, i.e., finitely lived agents linked though positive bequest.
As the result of Muller and Woodford (and the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem) de-
pends on an operative motive for private intergenerational transfers, several papers
have studied whether the bequests are positive in a variety of different models.3
The purpose of this note is to show that, contrarily to a widespread but erroneous
belief, no links exist between the positivity of bequests and the Muller and Woodford’s
result. Indeed, this result does not hinge upon the presence of a single infinitely lived
agent since we shall establish that the presence of an agent with altruistic preferences
(but who does not necessarily leave positive bequests) is sufficient to guarantee the
existence of at least one non-trivial steady state.
So, one agent who loves his children, whatever the intensity of this love, allows to
avoid a possible global contraction of the economy.4
To establish this result in a general and realistic setting, we focus on an OLG model
1According to Galor and Ryder (1989, 1991) (exogenous labor supply framework) or Nourry (2001)
(endogenous labor supply context), the Inada conditions (and well-behaved preferences) are not suf-
ficient to guarantee the existence of a non-trivial steady state in the Diamond model.
2A steady state is said to be trivial if the long-run capital /labor ratio is zero and non-trivial if
this ratio is positive.
3See, e.g., Weil (1987) or Thibault (2000) for explicit conditions under which bequests are positive.
4The contraction of the economy is global if and only if whatever the initial capital stock, the
long-run capital /labor ratio is zero.
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in which the population consists of agents with heterogenous degrees of altruism toward
their offspring whose labor supply is endogenous. This framework allows to encompass
most of the OLG models in which there is at least one agent a` la Barro.5
Note that such a macroeconomic model acknowledges the great heterogeneity in
consumer behavior that is apparent in the data.6 Indeed, it includes both low-wealth
households who fail to smooth consumption over time and high-wealth households who
smooth consumption both across years and across generations.
2 The economy
Consider a perfectly competitive economy which extends over infinite discrete time.
The economy consists of N ≥ 1 families denoted with h ∈ {1, ..., N}. In each period t,
the size of each family h is denoted byNht and grows at rate n. We consider a population
of size Nt which consists of a fraction p
h
t of each family h where the proportion p
h
t does
not vary through time. Hence:
∀t > 0 :
Nht
Nt
= pht = p
h and
h=N∑
h=1
ph = 1 and
Nt+1
Nt
=
Nht+1
Nht
= 1 + n
We assume that ph ∈ (0, 1] for h ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Consumers
Individuals of a family h are identical within as well as across generations and live for
two periods. Hence, a family can be identified with a dynasty. For altruistic agents, we
adopt Barro (1974)’s definition of altruism: parents care about their children welfare by
weighting their children’s utility in their own utility function and possibly leave them a
bequest. When young, altruists of dynasty h born at time t receive a bequest xht , work
5Our approach embodies a wide class of OLG models with exogenous labor supply: those where
agents are only altruists and those where the population is a mix of agents a` la Diamond and agents
a` la Barro (see, e.g., Michel and Pestieau (1998), Mankiw (2000) or Nourry and Venditti (2001)).
6See, e.g., Mankiw (2000).
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a portion lht of their first period, receive the market wage wtl
h
t , consume c
h
t and save
sht . When old, they consume part of the proceeds of their savings and bequeath the
remainder (1 + n)xt+1 to their (1 + n) children. Agents perfectly foresee
7 the interest
factor Rt+1. Importantly, the bequest is restricted to be non-negative. We denote by
V ht the utility of an altruist of dynasty h:
V ht (x
h
t ) = max
ch
t
,ℓh
t
,sh
t
,dh
t+1
,xh
t+1
U(cht , ℓ
h
t , d
h
t+1) + β
h V ht+1(x
h
t+1)
s.t wt(1− ℓ
h
t ) + x
h
t = c
h
t + s
h
t (1)
Rt+1s
h
t = d
h
t+1 + (1 + n)x
h
t+1 (2)
xht+1 ≥ 0 (3)
ℓht ∈ [0, 1] (4)
where V ht+1(x
h
t+1) denotes the utility of a representative descendant who inherits x
h
t+1,
U(ch, ℓh, dh) his life cycle utility8 which depends on consumptions (ch, dh) and leisure
ℓh = 1− lh and βh the intergenerational degree of altruism of the dynasty h.
We assume that βN ∈ (0, 1) and (if N > 1) βh ∈ [0, βN) for h ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}.
Therefore, N is the most altruistic dynasty and, when N > 1, this dynasty can coexist
with agents a` la Diamond (i.e., with a dynasty h with βh = 0).
Solving Vt(xt) gives the following optimality conditions:
Uc(c
h
t , ℓ
h
t , d
h
t+1) = Rt+1Ud(c
h
t , ℓ
h
t , d
h
t+1) (5)
wtUc(c
h
t , ℓ
h
t , d
h
t+1)−Uℓ(c
h
t , ℓ
h
t , d
h
t+1)


= 0 if lht > 0 (6a)
≤ 0 if lht = 0 (6b)
−(1 + n)Ud(c
h
t , ℓ
h
t , d
h
t+1) + βUc(c
h
t+1, ℓ
h
t+1, d
h
t+2) ≤ 0 (= if x
h
t+1 > 0) (7)
7de la Croix and Michel (2000) compare the dynamics under myopic foresight and under perfect
foresight in an OLG model with capital accumulation and two-period lived individuals.
8U(ch, ℓh, dh) is strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable over IR⋆+ × (0, 1) × IR
⋆
+ and
Uc(.) > 0, Uℓ(.) > 0, Ud(.) > 0, and lim
̺→0
Uc(̺, ℓ
h, dh) = lim
̺→0
Uℓ(c
h, ̺, dh) = lim
̺→0
Ud(c
h, ℓh, ̺) = +∞.
The Hessian of U is negative definite. Moreover, cht , ℓ
h
t and d
h
t+1 are normal goods.
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and the transversality condition (see Michel (1990)): lim
t→+∞
βt+1Ud(c
h
t−1, ℓ
h
t−1, d
h
t )x
h
t = 0.
Using the implicit function theorem, we can prove that the solution sht of (5) can
be expressed by a differentiable function s˘h(lht , wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1). After substitution of
cht and d
h
t+1 in (5) and (6a), the solutions l
h
t and s
h
t of these equations can be expressed
by differentiable functions sh(.) and lh(.) of wt, Rt+1, x
h
t and x
h
t+1. Since c and d
are normal goods, sh(.) is increasing with respect to (w.r.t.) xht and x
h
t+1 and l
h(.) is
decreasing w.r.t. xht , increasing w.r.t. x
h
t+1. The higher is the inheritance, the higher
are savings and leisure. The more an altruist wants to leave a bequest, the more he
works and saves. An increase in wt can induce two opposite effects: it can increase
labor supply because a higher wage incites to work more but it may decrease labor
supply because, to keep his income constant, an agent can work less. Hence, sh(.) is
not necessarily increasing w.r.t. its first argument. Concerning the second argument,
things are more complex and the sign of sh2 and l
h
2 are indeterminate. Taking into
account the constraint lht ≥ 0, the labor supply and the saving levels of an altruist who
inherits xht and wants to bequeath x
h
t+1 to each of his children may be locally expressed
by some continuous functions l˜h(.) and s˜h(.) of (wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1):
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lht = l˜
h(wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1) ≡ max[0, l
h(wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1)]
sht = s˜
h(wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1) ≡ s˘
h(l˜h(wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1), wt, Rt+1, x
h
t , x
h
t+1)
These functions allow to characterize the bequest and labor supply of an agent
of dynasty h. Note that if an altruist chooses to work, his savings function s˜h(.)
corresponds to the function sh(.). Since lh(.) is increasing with respect to xht , the
higher is the inheritance of an altruist, the lower is his labor supply.
It is also important to note that when xht and x
h
t+1 are zero, then the functions s
h(.)
and lh(.) give the savings and the labor supply of each selfish agents as functions of
9All the details of these tedious computations are in Appendix 1 of Thibault (2003). In that
companion paper we focus on the existence and specific characters of rentiers. Indeed, since altruists
can inherit, they can behave as rentiers, i.e., as individuals who can choose not to work.
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the wage rate and the interest rate. As the life cycle utility function U is identical for
the N dynasties,10 there exist some differentiable functions sDe(.) and lDe(.) such that
for all h: sDe(wt, Rt) ≡ s
h(wt, Rt, 0, 0) and l
De(wt, Rt) ≡ l
h(wt, Rt, 0, 0). From these
function, we also define the function ϑ : IR+ → IR+ such that:
ϑ(z) =
sDe(f(z)− zf ′(z), f ′(z))
(1 + n)lDe(f(z)− zf ′(z), f ′(z))
This function will be useful to analyze the bequest motive of an altruistic dynasty.
Firms
Production occurs according to a constant returns to scale technology F (.) using
two inputs, capital Kt and labor Lt.
11 Homogeneity of degree one allows us to write
output per young as a function of the capital/labor ratio per young f(zt) = F (zt, 1)
where zt = Kt/Lt. Markets are perfectly competitive. Each factor is paid its marginal
product. Assuming that capital fully depreciates after one period we obtain:
wt = FL(zt, 1) = f(zt)− ztf
′(zt) and Rt = FK(zt, 1) = f
′(zt) (8)
In each period, the labor market clears, i.e., Lt = Ntlt with lt = 1 −
∑h=N
h=1 p
hℓht .
The capital stock at time t+1 is financed by the savings of the young generation born
in t. Hence, Kt+1 = Ntst with st =
∑h=N
h=1 p
hsht . Therefore, in intensive form:
kt+1 = st/(1 + n) with kt+1 = Kt/Nt (9)
10For simplicity, the utility U is the same for all dynasties. Using Cobb-Douglas specifications, it is
possible to analyze equilibria of an economy in which this is not the case (see, e.g., Thibault (2001)).
11F (K,L) is twice continuously differentiable, homogeneous of degree 1 with respect to capital and
labor over the set IR⋆+ × IR
⋆
+ and satisfies: ∀L > 0 FK(., L) > 0, FKK(., L) < 0 and lim
L→0
F (K,L) = 0.
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3 When bequest motive avoids global contraction
We now confine our analysis to steady states. According to equations (5) and (7), the
long-term behavior of each dynasty must satisfy:
βhR ≤ 1 + n (= if xh > 0) (10)
Hence, only agents of dynasty N i.e., the dynasty endowed with the highest degree
of altruism, have the possibility to leave a bequest to their children.12
Note that it is sufficient to have some unconstrained altruistic agents to reach the
modified golden rule, and this result holds regardless of the proportion pN .13 Indeed,
when xN is positive, according to (8) and (10) the steady state capital/labor ratio z is
equal to f ′−1((1 + n)/βN). We denote this capital/labor ratio by zˆ.
First, using methodology developed in Thibault (2000), we derive a general condi-
tion under which the most altruist agents leave a positive bequests.14
Lemma 1 The most altruist agents leave positive bequests if and only if ϑ(zˆ) is lower
than the modified golden rule capital/labor ratio zˆ.
A strength of this condition is that it is valid whatever the number and stability
properties of steady states of the subjacent Diamond model with endogenous labor
supply. This model is defined as the economy described in section 2 with only life-
cyclers (i.e., with βN = 0). The steady states with no bequests of our economy are
linked with the steady states of the subjacent Diamond model in the following way:
12Indeed, if there exists i ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} such that xi > 0 then (10) is not satisfied for dynasties j
where j ∈ {i+ 1, ..., N}.
13Whatever their size, as well-known since Becker (1980)’s model with heterogenous infinitely lived
agents, the most patient (or altruistic) impose their view on the long-run capital accumulation.
14This lemma is a simple extension of Proposition 1 of Thibault (2000). Details of the proof of this
lemma are available at: http://durandal.cnrs-mrs.fr/GREQAM/dt/wp-pdf00/00A32.pdf
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Lemma 2 A steady state zDe of the subjacent Diamond model is a steady state with
zero bequests of our economy if and only if zDe is greater or equal to zˆ.
Proof. The steady states zDe of this subjacent Diamond model are solutions to
z = ϑ(z). According to (8) and (10), it is straightforward that a steady state zDe of
the subjacent Diamond model is a steady state with zero bequests of our economy if
and only if βhf ′(zDe) ≤ 1 + n, i.e., if and only if zDe ≥ zˆ. QED
Before focusing on the non-trivial steady states of our model, we establish a useful
and important property of the function ϑ.
Lemma 3 There exists a ratio z˜ above which the curve ϑ(z) is flatter than the 45◦ line.
Proof. Since agents cannot save more than their income: 0 ≤ sDe(w,R) ≤
wlDe(w,R). Hence 0 ≤ ϑ(z) ≤ (f(z) − zf ′(z))/(1 + n) i.e., 0 ≤ ϑ(z)/z ≤ [f(z)/z −
f ′(z)]/(1 + n). As f > 0, f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0 we have lim
z→+∞
(f(z)/z − f ′(z)) = 0. Then,
lim
z→+∞
ϑ(z)/z = 0. This infinite limit implies the lemma. QED
From lemma 1, 2, and 3 we now can establish the existence of a non-trivial steady state.
The existence result.
There exists at least one non-trivial steady-state equilibrium.
Proof. We can distinguish two cases according the number of equilibria of the
subjacent Diamond model. First, assume that the subjacent Diamond model has no
positive steady state. Then, the function ϑ(z) has non-trivial fixed point. According
to lemma 3, its form is necessarily as indicated in Figure 1 (left side). Then, we have
ϑ(zˆ) < zˆ. Therefore, according to lemma 1, our model has a non-trivial steady state:
the modified golden rule.
Second, assume that the subjacent Diamond model has positive steady states. If
the highest zDemax of these equilibria is larger than, or equal to, zˆ then, according to
lemma 2, it is a steady state with zero bequests of our economy. If zDemax is smaller
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Figure 1: First Case (left side) vs Second Case (right side)
than zˆ then the dynastic model has a steady state with operative bequests, because
we necessarily have ϑ(zˆ) < zˆ. Indeed, according to lemma 3, in this second case the
function ϑ(z) has the form depicted Figure 1 (right side). QED
To summarize, an agent with altruistic preferences (but who does not necessarily
leave positive bequests) is sufficient to guarantee the existence of at least one non-
trivial steady state. So, one agent who loves its children, whatever the intensity of this
love, allows to avoid a possible global contraction of the economy: it is the power of
love...
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